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Regulating Water and War in Iraq: A
Dangerous Dark Side of New Governance
TRACEY LEIGH DOWDESWELL & PATRICIA HANIA*
ABSTRACT
In the legal scholarship, the 'new governance' mode of governance
advances an administrative arrangement where decision-making is
shared amongst a range of actors, both public and private. The flexible,
responsive, and collaborative governance orientation is intended to
counter the ill effects of a coercive, top-down, state-centric, commandand-control approach to governance. Critics contend the new governance
framework can displace the interests of local communities, disempower
individuals, and dislodge basic human rights. The U.S. military has
adopted such an adaptive approach in its own governance structure,
which in this article is referred to as: the new governance "mentality."
This mentality of governance was employed in the U.S.'s post-conflict
reconstruction efforts in Iraq-efforts that were plagued by waste,
inefficiency, and corruption. Governance scholars have yet to ask the
question of what models of governance should apply in the post conflict
situation where the environmental violence of war has poisoned
waterscapes and degraded landscapes. Should an adaptive mode of new
governance be applied in post conflict situations where public
institutions are weak and beset by corruption? What is the role of the
state and private actors when the war is over and the reconstruction
period begins? In this article, we explore a dark side of the new
governance framework through the case study of the Iraq war theatre
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generous comments provided by the peer reviewers and the IJGLS editorial team, in
particular, Jia Li (Editor-in-Chief), Lydia Barbash-Riley, and Daniel Cyr. Finally, our
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and examine how the transformed military culture shaped the 20032013 Coalition operations in Iraq and the reconstruction effort-in
particular, the provision of safe, clean drinking water to local
communities.
INTRODUCTION

The "new governance" model, advanced by legal scholars, promotes
an administrative arrangement in which decision-making is shared
among a range of actors, both public and private.' Often, this
relationship is privatized and controlled by the terms of a contract. This
flexible, responsive, and collaborative governance orientation is
intended to counter the ill effects of a coercive, top-down, state-centric,
command-and-control style to governance. Critics contend the new
governance framework can displace the interests of local communities,
disempower individuals, and dislodge basic human rights. 2
Recently, military organizational scholarship has documented a
shift in the army's governance to an adaptive mode.3 This flexible mode
of governance recognizes that "[t]oday's army is fighting a new kind of
war that demands a new approach to how it trains, equips, and uses
soldiers." 4 In support of this organizational change, junior officers and
soldiers on the ground are expected to be responsive to the local
situation and must "make quick decisions, learning through trial and
error and sometimes departing from standard Army procedures."5
Captain Nicholas Ayers, who led a unit in Iraq, described this reactive
practice of decision-making, where he was expected "to come up with
6
new solutions to situations the Army had never before encountered."
1. See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012)
[hereinafter THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE]; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 342 (2004); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public
Action: An Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
GOVERNANCE 1 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
2. Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 333 (2009).
See also Lisa T. Alexander, Reflections on Success and Failurein New Governance and the
Role of the Lawyer, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 737 (2012); Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder
Participation in New Governance: Lessons from Chicago's Public Housing Reform
Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 117 (2009).
3. CHAD C. SERENA, A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY ADAPTATION: THE US ARMY IN THE
IRAQ WAR 47-48 (2011).
4. RICHARD L. DAFT, ORGANIZATION THEORY AND DESIGN 28 (9th ed. 2007)
(referencing Greg Jaffe, Trial by Fire: On Ground in Iraq, Capt. Ayers Writes His Own
Playbook, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 2004, at Al).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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This responsive mode of governance reflects a new mentality (or culture)
for the military that is coined in this article as the U.S. Military's "new
governance mentality"-a mentality that is defined as an adaptive,
devolved, decision-making model.
But what is not new for soldiers is the environmental violence of
war-the strategic use of the environment as a target.7 While in the fog
of war, where the soldier is disconnected from the environmental impact
of his or her actions upon local citizens and communities, this shift to a
new governance mentality is dangerous because it may be permissive of
human rights violations and creates an environmental injustice
situation in the post-conflict scenario. 8 Governance scholars have yet to
ask the following questions: What model of governance should apply in
the post-conflict state, where the environmental violence of war has
poisoned waterscapes and degraded landscapes? Is a responsive and
adaptive mode of new governance appropriate in the post conflict
setting? Furthermore, what are the roles of state and private actors,
including corporations and non- governmental organizations, when the
war is done and the reconstruction period begins?
Interestingly, the organizational development business literature
has also documented a governance shift as demonstrated by the
"dismantling of the bureaucratic-hierarchal" architecture of firms "to
introduce a flatter, more responsive [organizational] structure; and reengineered business processes."9 Homogeneity in governance forms and
values has emerged from the business, military, and governance
literatures. What does this overlap in theory tell us about the danger of
transplanting a new governance mentality into a post-conflict situation,
its impact on decision-makers, and "on the ground" decision-making
practices?
In a post-conflict setting, particularly in former colonial territories
such as Iraq in which governance institutions may be very weak or non-

7. See generally DAVID E. MOSHER ET AL., GREEN WARRIORS: ARMY ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FROM PLANNING THROUGH POSTCONFLICT
(2008),
http://www.aepi.army.mil/docs/whatsnewRAND-MG632.pdf
[hereinafter GREEN WARRIORS]
8. Id.; A post-conflict situation is often referred to as "stability," "reconstruction," and
"nation-building" activities. see also RAND CORP., THE ARMY'S GREEN WARRIORS:
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSIDERATIONS
IN
CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONS
(2008),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research-briefs/2008/RANDRB9335.pdf
(a
research brief for GREEN WARRIORS, supra note 7).
9. John Hassard et al., Managing in the New Economy: Restructuring White-Collar
Work in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, in 21ST CENTURY
MANAGEMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 65, 66 (Charles Wankel ed., 2008) [hereinafter
Managing the New Economy].
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existent,1 0 the influence of the U.S. military's new governance mentality
highlights the deficiencies of these private-public governance
arrangements where private actors are transformed into regulators of
public services. In this article, we explore a dark side of the new
governance framework through the case study of the Iraq war theatre
and the water sector. We examine how the transformed military culture
shaped the 2003-2013 Coalition operations in Iraq and the
reconstruction effort-in particular, the provision of safe, clean drinking
water to local communities. While the U.S. Army has actively
participated in restoring local drinking water, sewer, electricity, and
trash services," the RAND Institute has reported: "[T]here is a lack of
attention to and consideration for environmental issues in contingency
operations through much of the Army. Many Army personnel assume
environmental considerations are someone else's responsibility."12
Accordingly, we question whether the military's new governance
mentality augmented the army's lack of an environmental ethos
throughout its theater of military operations in Iraq. 13 The weak and
ineffective reconstruction campaign not only points to a failure to
10. See, e.g., Nelida Fuccaro, Ethnicity, State Formation, and Conscription in
Postcolonial Iraq: The Case of the Yazidi Kurds of Jabal Sinjar,29 INT'L J.L. MIDDLE E.
STUD. 559 (1997) (discussing the shaping of postcolonial Iraqi society).

11. It is reported that "after the Army helped repair a well in Iraq, an Iraqi citizen
said, 'When this well is done, each time somebody takes a drink of water they will say the
Americans did something good."' GREEN WARRIORS, supra note 7, at 119. It is noteworthy
that insurgency activities seem to be highest in areas of weak water, sewer, electricity and
trash service:
Evidence from operational experience in Iraq suggests that
environmental problems may contribute to insurgency problems. From
fall 2003 throughout 2004, the 1st Cavalry Division, under the
command of Major General Chiarelli, developed, managed, and worked
on numerous SWET [sewer, water, electricity and trash] projects in
Baghdad, including cleaning and repairing clogged sewer lines,
collecting trash, and building a new landfill. Using Geographic
Information System (GIS) databases and tools to analyze geospatial
patterns, General Chiarelli's intelligence officers determined that the
insurgency was strongest in areas with little or no sewer service,
faltering electricity, and high unemployment. Addressing sewer, trash,
drinking-water, and electricity issues was important for the "fence
sitters" who had not yet decided whether to support the new
government or the insurgency. These poor or barely middle-class Iraqis
who often do not have jobs are prime recruitment pools for the
insurgents. General Chiarelli contends that by giving them jobs and
helping to address SWET problems, they will see that the Americans
are helping and may decide not to join the insurgency. In fact, the 1st
Cavalry Division found that where services were restored, insurgent
attacks fell sharply."
Id. at 119-20.
12. Id. at 103.
13. Id. at 103, 111.
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empower local governance, but also amplifies conflict-induced
environmental harms-an environmental injustice situation where local
communities are left to live with the insidious eco-health effects created
by war and its environmental legacy. Governance scholars must
consider whether the adoption of new governance mentalities of
privatization, decentralization, fallibility, and devolved decision-making
hamper our ability to protect socio-economic rights and the environment
during war and in the post-conflict reconstruction period.14
In this article, we examine the new governance framework as
applied in the modern U.S. Military. Part I outlines the core principles
of the new governance mentality. Part II presents the new governance
mentality adopted by the U.S. military during the "revolution in
military affairs" as it sought to restructure the U.S. Army in the postCold War era. Part III discusses the old governance mentality of
command-and-control established in Iraq by the British during their
World War I campaign, which provides a point of reference to
understand the reconstruction efforts undertaken in Iraq in the past
decade. Part IV outlines the environmental degradation in Iraq because
of the 2003 invasion, partly due to the use of chemical weapons and
military tactics during the Coalition campaign.15
I. THE NEW GOVERNANCE MENTALITY
The new governance model is viewed in part as a reaction to the
traditional command-and-control style to governing,' 6 and a response to
the trend of deregulation and privatization of the neo-liberal era that
14. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(3), Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that the intentional
targeting of civilians in armed conflict is specifically prohibited under international law);
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (stating that it is a war crime to intentionally direct an attack against any
civilian not taking a direct part in hostilities). See GREEN WARRIORS, supranote 7, at 158163, for a listing of international law and treaties that relate to the environment.
15. See generally SABYA FARooQ ET. AL., MEDACT, CONTINUING COLLATERAL DAMAGE:
THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF WAR ON IRAQ 2003 (Jane Salvage ed., 2003),
http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/medact-iraq-2003.pdf [hereinafter MEDAcT REPORT].
16. For some of the many descriptions of the new governance model (NG) in the
literature, see, for example, Bradley C. Karkkainen, 'Wew Governance" in Legal Thought

and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV.
471, 474 (2004) (describing new governance as "open-textured, participatory, bottom-up,
consensus-oriented, contextual, flexible, integrative, and pragmatic"); and Neil Walker &
GrAinne de Btirca, Reconceiving Law & New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 519, 520
(2007) (contending that "causal analyses" of law and NG are insufficient because they fail
to reveal how NG shapes law and how law shapes NG with modern regulatory regimes).

458

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 21:2

shifted the boundaries connecting the public and the private spheres.17
Contemporary governance has been reshaped by the managerial
ideology of the New Public Management (NPM) that gained influence
beginning in the 1980s,18 and then by the later adoption of the new
governance framework. Some scholars contend the new governance
approach brought in a "cluster of new .

.

. values"19 that under some

organizational structures can advance a neo-liberal corporate
orientation into the public law arena.
The nation-state and the idea that effective control is maintained by
a centralized, bureaucratic chain of command 20 has been transformed by
the new governance paradigm. Governance scholar Neil Gunningham
contends that "[n]ormatively, new governance is claimed to be more
responsive, legitimate, and effective than top-down approaches because
deliberation, cooperation, and learning at the local level may lead to
responses which better take account of local circumstances, build on
local knowledge and capacities[.]" 2 1 The role and function of the state
has shifted from a command-and-control implementation style to more
of an orchestrator of a participatory and localized mode of governance.
The features of decentralization, privatization, a minimal state, and
corporate or "entrepreneurial" governance and self-organizing systems
rather than centralized and top-down management inform the new
governance model. 22 Like NPM, the collaborative orientation of the
contemporary new governance framework is directed at learning,
information gathering, and coordination of actors based upon the
assumption that the "state and government agencies [could] learn from
the practices of private organizational models and market-based
management theories." 23 In this way, the new governance mentality

17. See generally Jon Pierre, Governance and Institutional Flexibility, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE, supranote 1, at 187.
18. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992).

19. Chris Tollefson et al., Symposium Overview: Conceptualizing New Governance
Arrangements, 90 PUB. ADMIN. 3, 6 (2012).
20. GARETH MORGAN, CREATIVE ORGANIZATION THEORY: A RESOURCEBOOK 49 (1989).

21. Neil Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The
Localization of Regulation, 36 J.L. & SOC'Y 145,146 (2009).
22. R. A. W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 POL.
STUD. 652, 653 (1996).
23. Orly Lobel, Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 365-66 (2004) [hereinafter Renew
Deal]. See also Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE, supra notel, at 65. For a response to Renew Deal, see
generally Karkkainen, supra note 16, and for Lobel's reply to Karkkainen, see generally
Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004).
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subsumes and creates space for a range of privatization principles:
efficiency, flexibility, and decentralized decision-making.
The new governance framework also advances a mentality of
participation and partnership that includes a range of actors. The
governance exercise becomes one of a shared "normative authority"24
amongst levels of authority and decision-makers with diverse outcome
expectations. Decision-making becomes a collaborative task.
Collectively, decision-makers become norm generators, as these
individuals "are involved in the process of developing the norms of
behavior and changing them."25 This collaborative partnership involves
promoting horizontal-as opposed to hierarchical-relationships, with
the effect of blurring private and public values. In this shared decisionmaking mode, we might see the private sector becoming regulators of
public resources such as the public water system. The active
participation of the private sector may result in traditional government
functions being dispensed to a diverse array of private actors.
Experimentation-a willingness to innovate and a tolerance for
failure-is a feature of the new governance framework. 26 Conceptually,
experimentation is tied to the principle of subsidiarity, which
"maintains that all governmental tasks are best carried out at the level
closest to those affected by them." 27 Given the new governance
mentality has a strong focus on the importance of information
management, the subsidiarity principle highlights the importance of
local information, in particular, "[t]hose closest to the problem [who]
possess the best information leading toward a potential solution." 28 With
subsidiarity, devolved decision-making is fostered, as is collaboration,
which together underpin the principles of flexibility and fallibility.
Flexibility and non-coerciveness are intended to replace "top-down
ordering, implementation, and enforcement" 29 with negotiable and
revisable norms. In effect, a subtle move away from sanctions and
penalties of the command-and-control regime promotes a new
organizational ordering.30 Instead, the new governance framework
upholds individual choice and freedom of action, 31 although this freedom
may not be evenly distributed among all actors: "[it] is often better to
allow a range of interpretation, deviance, and trial and error without

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Renew Deal, supranote 23, at 373.
Id. at 377.
See id. at 381-82.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id. at 388.
See id. at 391.
Id. at 389.
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the constraints of rigid orders and fear of formal sanctions." 32 In other
words, experimentation in decision-making is encouraged.
The laissez-faire orientation underpinning the turn to the new
governance model fosters fallibility, adaptability, and dynamic
learning."3 Fallibility means that actors are "optimistic about
uncertainty and doubt"34 as governance is a learning process rather
than a social-ordering task.35 This idea of experimentation creates
institutional space for accepting mistakes, which are also viewed as
learning opportunities rather than failures. 36
In essence, the new governance project is one of "institutional
change." 37 The new governance framework results in an organizational
restructuring that takes into account how to govern from the ground up:
that is, in a participatory, pluralistic, and localized mode where a
flatter, adaptive, self-regulatory organizational structure emerges from
the attributes of new governance. The normative framework creates an
institutional culture that supports devolved decision-making and is
reactive to local conditions on the ground; it fosters the freedom to make
decisions; it breaks down the rigid, hierarchal information channels
established under a state centered governance approach; and it reorients the centralized roles and functions of the state to support a
network governance approach. Yet, the question of whether the new
governance model is effective in a post-conflict situation remains open,
and relatively unexplored.
New governance experiments have been explored in numerous
spheres including the area of social regulation, for example
environmental
protection.
Similarly,
modern
organizational
development theory purports similar attributes of responsiveness,
flexibility, and changeable environment in response to an organizational
theory shift away from a hierarchal, command-and-control structure to
a more networked, flatter, self-regulatory organizational form.38 Today,
global firms by "downsizing and delayering" have reordered their
bureaucratic management systems "in order to cut costs, speed up
decision making" and "become more flexible and responsive to customer
demands and competitive pressures."39 The U.S. military also offers an
example of a recent organizational change campaign that shifted its
32. Id. at 393.
33. Id. at 395.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id. at 399.
37. Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33
J.L. & Soc. INQUIRY 503, 503 (2008).
38. MORGAN, supranote 20.

39. Managing the New Economy, supra note 9, at 66.
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culture toward a more adaptive, devolved decision-making model or
what this article refers to as new governance mentality. 40
A danger of the new governance paradigm, especially in armed
conflict, is the loss of personal liberty and an individual's ability to
maintain one's well-being, issues fundamentally tied to protecting the
natural environment.4 1 Governance scholar Orly Lobel warns, "we must
consider the ever-changing predicament of liberty, and the ever new
methods by which it may be augmented and curtailed."42 The prime goal
of security governance-whether in a military or domestic post conflict
situation-is the use of coercion and the threat of coercion to maintain
social order. Lobel's warning points to a dark side of this governance
approach and a mismatch in governance norms (in particular, new
governance mentality: devolved decision-making with the new
governance mentality and coercive techniques with security governance
mechanisms). While the performance of governing is exhibited by the
soldier's devolved decision-making practices promoted by the new
governance mentality, coercion is the preferred method used to carry
out the security governance goals. In a post-conflict situation, achieving
good environmental governance practices is complicated by the
competing interest of maintaining security through coercion, which
exposes the precarious state of personal liberty and leaves unclear the
environmental consequences of this adaptive mode of governance.

40. See generally SERENA, supra note 3; Ben Barry, Adapting in War, 54 SURVIVAL:
GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY 171, 174 (2012) (reviewing WILLIAMSON MURRAY, MILITARY
ADAPTATION IN WAR: WITH FEAR OF CHANGE (2011)). Barry states: "Command and tactics
have become ever more decentralised and dispersed, amplifying the difficulties posed by
wars' inherent frictions. And the ever-increasing need for bureaucratic systems of
managing armed forces in peacetime - essential for efficiency, logistics and administration
- often act to inhibit flexibility and adaptation in war." Barry's comments highlight the
need to consider the governance orientation in time of war and times of peace or peace
making; See also DAFT, supra note 4. Daft states: "Many organizations are shifting from
strict vertical hierarchies to flexible, decentralized structures that emphasize horizontal
collaboration, widespread information sharing and adaptability. This shift can clearly be
seen in the U.S. Army, once considered the ultimate example of a rigid, top-down
organization. Today's army is fighting a new kind of war that demands a new approach to
how it trains, equips, and uses soldiers. Fighting a fluid, fast-moving, and fast changing
terrorist network means that junior officers in the field who are experts on local situation
have to make quick decisions, learning through trial and error and sometimes departing
from standard Army procedures. . . . 'This is entirely a bottom-up war,' says Major John
Nagl, third-in-command of a battalion near Fallujah Iraq. 'It is the platoon leaders and
commanders that are fighting it."'
41. GREEN WARRIORS, supra note 7, at 9 ("[D]uring summer 2004, diseases such as
typhoid and hepatitis were rampant in Baghdad. Supplying clean drinking water is
therefore a key reconstruction priority in such areas.").
42. Renew Deal, supra note 23, at 357.
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II. THE U.S. MILITARY'S ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW GOVERNANCE MENTALITY

The modern military culture has been characterized as flexible,
innovative, and responsive to surprise and uncertainty. General Eric
Shinseki described the modern military as a "transformed army [that]
would be more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal,
survivable, and sustainable than the pre-transformation force and that
the strategic flexibility inherent to the objective force would enable
dominance at 'every point on the spectrum of operations."'4 3This shift in
the military's governance culture began in the late 1980s with the end
of the Cold War, the changing global economic order, and the need to
adapt to economic processes of globalization. 44
In its drive to restructure and respond to the challenges of the postCold War era, the U.S. military adopted many of the new governance
attributes. Arguably, the military's reorganization is expressed by the
shift away from command-control doctrines and the influence of the
"Intent-Based Orders" 45 and "Standing Rules of Engagement,4 6 which
were shaped to adopt the features of a modern organization transformed
in line with new governance mentalities. These new military doctrines
devolve decision-making onto individual soldiers, which increases the
risk that a solider could use lethal force against local civilians and
within their communities. One might inquire whether, in the haze of
war, individual soldiers thus empowered consider the environmental
impact of their decision-making on citizens' well-being and a civilian's
capacity to flourish in the future. The question is raised: Does a solider
consider the impact of security forces' presence on a citizen's capacity to
engage in decision-making in post-conflict governance institutions?
43. SERENA, supra note 3.
44. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND, ARMY 21: A CONCEPT FOR
THE FUTURE: UMBRELLA CONCEPT (1988); YOAV BEN-HORIN & BENJAMIN SCHWARZ, ARMY
21 AS THE U.S. ARMY'S FUTURE WARFIGHTING CONCEPT: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF APPROACH
AND ASSUMPTIONS (1988); STEVEN METZ & JAMES KIEVIT, THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY
AFFAIRS AND CONFLICT SHORT OF WAR (1994); WILLIAM E. ODOM, AMERICA'S MILITARY
REVOLUTION: STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE AFTER THE COLD WAR (1993); STEPHEN PETER
ROSEN, WINNING THE NEXT WAR: INNOVATION AND THE MODERN MILITARY (1991). See also
RAND CORP., MODERN DECISION SCIENCE SUGGESTS NEW METHODS AND TOOLS TO

SUPPORT MILITARY DECISIONMAKING (2005), available at http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/researchbriefs/2005/RAND RB177.pdf; GREEN WARRIORS, supra note 7.
45. "Intent-based orders" are commands to perform a mission without specifying how it
is to be accomplished. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF

MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 46 (2014), httpJ/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new-pubs/jp.02.pdf.
46. "Rules of Engagement" are standing directives that specify the circumstances
under which soldiers will engage in combat activities and use force in a combat zone. Id. at

240-41.
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Under traditional military doctrine, soldiers were bound by a rigid
command structure, including a hierarchical chain of command with
decision-making centralized in the apex of the command structure. This
system of centralized command-control also applied to soldiers fighting
in counterinsurgent and unconventional operations that often formed
the bulk of day-to-day soldiering. 47 The traditional centralized and
hierarchical concepts of command-control required unity of command:
that is, a single, clearly defined commander responsible for each
operation, and a hierarchical, clear, and unequivocal command
structure. 48 Under this traditional organizational structure, command is
centralized with a senior commander issuing all orders.
By the late 1980s, this centralized chain of command was rapidly
becoming obsolete to make room for a new governance mentality-to
reiterate, a mentality that is defined as an adaptive, devolved, decisionmaking model. The US military began to institutionalize Intent-Based
Orders and Standing Rules of Engagement that, in effect, decentralized
the chain of command and pushed decision-making down to the lowest
level-the soldier on the ground, as experienced by Captain Nicholas
Ayers in Iraq.49 Under Intent-Based Orders, individual soldiers are
expected to rely on their initiative and personal judgment to determine
how best to meet their overall mission assignments as they are only
informed of the mission's goals, not instructed how to accomplish the
mission.50 Similarly, Rules of Engagement permit soldiers' broad
discretion, for example, in using lethal force. 51 Together, the
introduction of Intent-Based Orders and Rules of Engagement signaled
a shift in military doctrine to a new governance mentality.
As the literature well documents, the new governance mentality had
achieved a significant degree of institutionalization before the U.S.
launched its 2003 invasion of Iraq. 52 Francis Fukuyama and Abram N.
47. See U.S. MARINE CORPS, SMALL WARS MANUAL 36 (1940).
48. DEP'T OF NAT'L DEF., CFJP 01: CANADIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE 5-3 (Victor A.
McPherson et al. eds., 2009) (Can.).
49. See DAFT, supranote 4.
50. See MATTHEw L. SMITH, THE FIVE PARAGRAPH FIELD ORDER: CAN A BETTER
FORMAT BE FOUND TO TRANSMIT COMBAT INFORMATION TO SMALL TACTICAL UNITS? 15
(1988). See also Tracey Dowdeswell, How Atrocity Becomes Law: The Neoliberalisationof
Security Governance and the Customary Laws of Armed Conflict, 6 J. CRITICAL GLOBAL
STUD. 30, 41-44 (2013) (providing an overview of these issues in greater depth by one of

the authors).
51. See Dowdeswell, supra note 50, at 44.
52. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama & Abram N. Shulsky, Military Organization in the
Information Age: Lessons from the World of Business, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF

INFORMATION IN WARFARE 327 (Zalmay Khalilzad et al. eds., 1999); Eitan Shamir, The
Long and Winding Road: The US Army Managerial Approach to Command and the
Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik), 33 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 645 (2010). For
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Shulsky, leaders in advocating organizational change in the U.S.
military, drew heavily on modern organizational management theory to
argue for the reorganization of the military along corporate lines. 5 3 In
their view, the U.S. military could benefit from the lessons learned
during the restructuring of commercial organizations.54 These scholars
promoted a reorganization strategy that envisioned a flatter
organizational structure, decentralized decision-making, networks,
information linkages, experimentation, and the freedom to fail.
Fukuyama and Shulsky envisioned a shift in the military
organization towards new technologies-principally, technologies of
governance.55 These scholars argued for new communications and
information management systems that paralleled those adopted by
corporations: private companies that had already moved towards flatter,
more agile, and adaptive self-organized organizational structures. In
their view, the military should improve information efficiencies by
adopting a .'Wal-Mart'-type system of logistics" and supply chain
management.56 Flattening
organizational
structures improves
information flow, as Kodak demonstrated during its restructuring in the
1990s. 5 7 These scholars contend military culture should advance
innovation and creativity by pushing responsibility downward and
outward as experienced by many high-tech companies in Silicon
Valley.58
In procurement, Fukuyama and Shulsky recommended the military
develop relationships with private firms. The military should contract
with firms on a "sole source" basis to tap into "private industry's ability
to operate quickly and flexibly."59 These authors hoped that this
relational focus would foster a close partnership between the program
office and the private contractor, further familiarizing military officers
with "commercial practices."60 In effect, privatization norms would be
relied upon to subtly shape the military's procurement sector.
the US military's treatment of these issues, see, for example, WILLIAM K. BABB, FUTURE
UNITED STATES MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (2001); TIMOTHY F. WATSON,
AMERICAN CENTURIONS: DEVELOPING U.S. ARMY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2002).
53. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA & ABRAM N. SHULSKY, THE "VIRTUAL CORPORATION" AND ARMY
ORGANIZATION (1997) [hereinafter THE VIRTUAL CORPORATION]. The United States
Department of Defense sponsored this study.
54. Id. at i.
55. Id. at ix.
56. Id. at xiii.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 16.
59. Id. at 70.
60. Id. This is an apt description of the United State's relationship with Halliburton
KBR during the Iraq War.
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The military's rationalized bureaucratic organizational design is
viewed as a relic of Max Weber's industrial age.61 Modern organizations,
like the military, should be more spontaneous. In line with this theme of
spontaneity, Fukuyama and Shulsky advocated for the military's
organizational structure to be "designed in more of the self-organizing
fashion of biological systems, rather than being conceived as elaborate
mechanical systems designed and controlled from the top." 62 The
modern information age required "new forms of organization and
completely redesigned processes." 63 In short, they argued that the U.S.
military could benefit from the experience of private corporations in
adapting to the revolutions engendered by information technologies and
economic globalization. 64
Like private corporations, these scholars maintained that the U.S.
military should institutionalize fallibility and the "freedom to fail" so
that it might "foster an adaptive and innovative culture."65 Even serious
failures can be overlooked "when they are seen as resulting from the
taking of reasonable risks."66 According to these authors, the constraints
of a centralized governance regime were to be discarded under the
military's new governance mentality.
Specifically, in military maneuvers, Fukuyama and Shulsky
reasoned that a flatter, more decentralized command structure could
improve strategic battle command: a flat organizational structure
promotes making decisions "rapidly, decisively, [and] stealthily."67 In
their view, the traditional emphasis on centralizing the chain of
command was rooted in the bureaucratized institutional culture of the
U.S. military, not its functionality in battle.68 Missing in their critique,
however, is evidence that decentralization and Intent-Based Orders are,
in fact, more functional-that is, responsive to the changing conditions
of battle while protecting individual liberty and a civilian family's
ability to flourish.
Fukuyama and Shulsky's promotion of a flatter institutional
perspective is also advanced by organizational theory and reinforced by
the new governance model, which leaves one wondering if the new
61. See generally MORGAN, supra note 20; see also DAFT, supra note 4. Daft notes:

"[T]he U.S. Army, [was] once considered the ultimate example of a rigid, top-down
organization." It embodied an organizational design displaying the classic features of Max
Weber's bureaucracy.
62. THE VIRTUAL CORPORATION, supranote 53, at 70.

63. Id. at 5.
64. Id. at 4.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

77.
78.
46.
45.

466

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 21:2

governance mentality is essentially an idea-a by-product of neoliberal
ideology. Perhaps it is an idea detached from the soldier's experience in
combat and the consequences of individual decision-making in the
complicated, hyper-intense situation of the battlefront; an isolating,
complex situation that separates the solider from the natural
environment and where the fog of war can distort one's moral decisionmaking.
In adopting Fukuyama and Shulsky's vision, the military must also
incorporate an ethic of environmental care at the institutional level.
While to some, it might seem counterintuitive to demand an institution
with a mission statement tied to war to advance an ethic of
environmental care especially during a military campaign, to others, the
military should be a moral institution. While recognizing the
complicated situation of the fog of war, the military's organizational
culture should move toward an institutionalized environmental
awareness or conscience based on the concept of corporate social
responsibility: a concept that advances the "core values of our
[globalized] society - respect for quality of life, the environment and
human dignity."69 In light of the military's organizational shift to a new
governance mentality, we ask: Who pays the price for the war's sinister,
slow-moving environmental harms? The military's adoption of the new
governance mentality to frame it's organizational change model must
find space to incorporate core values-respect for quality of life, the
environment, and human dignity-and acknowledge that the natural
environment is transformed into a strategic weapon of war. As a weapon
of war, environmental warfare results in mass environmental
destruction that creates a precarious eco-health situation for those
civilian communities left to clean up the toxic mess.
Interestingly, the characteristics of General Eric Shinseki's
modernized military seem to easily map onto the features of the new
governance model, which raises a host of new questions. While it
remains to be seen whether there are good reasons to advocate for
69. Philippa Collins, Ethical Manufacturing, in 21ST CENTURY MANAGEMENT: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 464 (Charles Wankel ed., 2008) [hereinafter Ethical
Manufacturing]. While we recognize that numerous definitions of the concept of corporate
social responsibility (CSR) exist, we adopt the view advanced by the European
Commission: CSR "refers to companies taking responsibility for their impact on society."
Enterprise and Industry, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eulenterprise/policies/
sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/index.en.htm (last visited July 17,
2014). Philippa Collins describes the EU's concept of social responsibility as an "idea that
everyone, not just managers and directors, have a responsibility to take action." Collins,
supra. According to Collins, CSR is viewed by the European Commission as "vital because
it mirrors the core values of our society- respect for quality of life, the environment and
human dignity." Collins, supra, at 461.
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devolved decision-making, fallibility, experimentation, and voluntary
compliance in a military campaign, we query whether the ready
adoption of a new governance mentality is suitable when a post-conflict
situation of environmental degradation emerges from the wreckage of
war. Serious issues concerning accountability under the new governance
framework as related to public sector services arise-in particular, the
provision of clean drinking water to civilians-and, raises the question:
Is the new governance model appropriate in a post-conflict situation?
Alternatively, should the state(s) involved institute a more traditional,
state-centric, command-control model of governance for the provision of
essential services such as clean, safe drinking water? In order to better
address this question, we explore the "old style" of governance laid down
by the British during their colonial campaign in Mesopotamia, and how
this regime built the foundations for modern Iraq's water infrastructure.
III. "OLD GOVERNANCE:" THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA AND A
STATE-CENTRIC MODEL OF WATER MANAGEMENT
Iraq's natural environment and public waterworks have a long
history of being used as strategic weapons during an armed conflict. 70
This first occurred on a grand scale on the Mesopotamian Front during
World War I, and these events helped to lay the foundation for much of
modern Iraq's pre-invasion public waterworks.71 The British experience
in governing Iraq during this period was that of a centralized
administration with a command-and-control implementation style of
governance. British forces undertook a massive campaign of building
waterworks and associated industrial infrastructure as part of their war
effort against the Ottoman Empire in Mesopotamia. Iraq's water sector
was laid down in this period, and therefore has close connections to
empire building, the large-scale industrialization of colonial possessions,
and the British form of centralized governance.
By the nineteenth century, state building required a sophisticated
bureaucracy to meet the demands of industrialization and colonization
in an increasingly complex social environment. The British campaign
against the Ottomans on the Mesopotamian Front during World War I
is a typical example of this style of governance. The British campaign
70. See generally GREEN WARRIORS, supra note 7, at 3-7 (explaining the use of dams,

oil wells, and other natural resources as strategic targets during military conflicts in the
Middle East).
71. See generally L.J. HALL, THE INLAND WATER TRANSPORT IN MESOPOTAMIA Xii

(R.H.W. Hughes ed., 1921) [hereinafter INLAND WATER TRANSPORT] (describing that a lack
of adequate river transport directly resulted in the British army's inability to break the
Turkish siege near Amara).
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began with a stunning military defeat of British forces at Kut al Amara.
The British identified the lack of modern river transportation as one of
the principal causes of their downfall. 72 With the disastrous siege at Kut
coming just a few months after their defeat at Gallipoli, the British
forces retrenched at their base at Basra in southern Iraq, reassessed
their strategy, and then began an 18-month campaign to build
navigable river transportation, ports, bridges, and railroads across
southern Iraq.73 During this time, the British forces dredged and
channeled a navigation route along the 500-mile river system of the
Tigris and Euphrates, and built a large fleet of river barges, in order to
prepare for their final march to Baghdad in March of 1917.74
Expatriate laborers, under the command of the British, built the
canals in Basra and irrigation works in the Mesopotamian
Marshlands. 75 Besides focusing on river transport, the strategic military
goal included the expansion of agricultural irrigation and fisheries in
order to feed the British troops and their labor force.76 This strategic
reconstruction effort included extensive dredging and land reclamation
for irrigation throughout the marshlands.77 The British completed the
construction of these infrastructure works with a labor force of about
7,100 workers, primarily skilled workers from India and China.7 8 Troop
strength during this time was approximately 40,000.79 The British
Colonial Army was the primary force waging the Mesopotamian
campaign, and most of these troops came from India, Nigeria, and West
Africa. The local population also played an important role as pilots of
the river fleet that travelled along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and
their many tributaries.8 0
The British public works projects built during the Mesopotamian
campaign of World War I exemplify the kind of "old governance" that
European armies used in empire-building campaigns. The British
administered Mesopotamia as a colony and transplanted their
established governance structures that relied upon an organization of
government ministries and agencies. One of these was the Department
of River Conservancy, which later became Iraq's first Ministry of

72. Id. at xvi.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 115-123.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 115-123.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 126.

Id. at 81 (explaining that the only pilots available with good experience of the river
were Arabs).
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Irrigation in 1917.81 At that time, approximately 34,000 employees
managed Iraq's ports, river transport, dams, and irrigation systems. 82
Much of Iraq's water sector infrastructure can therefore be attributed to
this period of British control.
In the bureaucratic spirit of routinized and a centralized
administrative structure, the British viewed the auditing, accounting,
and anti-corruption processes as key administrative oversight measures
of the public works projects in the Mesopotamian region. For example,
the War Office stated "all officers dealing in any manner with
Government funds should submit their statements of accounts to the
Superintendent, the whole being submitted by him to the audit
8
authorities at the Base."*
Comprehensive records of the projects
undertaken,
including personnel,
acquisitions,
accounts,
and
procurements were kept by hand without the assistance of modern
information technologies, and were made publically available. 84 This
detailed administrative control allowed the work to proceed efficiently,
transparently, and with minimal loss of scant public revenues.
As with present-day Iraq, the security situation in Mesopotamia
during World War I was difficult and dangerous, and destruction of
public works served as a military tactic. In one of several incidents,
Ottoman forces breached the dam at Fallujah during their retreat,
flooding the surrounding countryside. In a rebuilding effort, the British
repaired the dam and continued to drain the land before building a
railroad and retaking the city.8 5 Iraq, thus, has a long history of public
water works being used as weapons in armed conflict, which often
resulted in a devastated natural environment.
Recent military campaigns in Iraq illustrate that the natural
environment and public works projects continue to be used as strategic
instruments of environmental warfare. In the war theater, water
systems and landscapes are targeted receptacles for strategic
"minelaying."86 The deployment of chemical weapons exposes the hidden
yet planned use of the environment in warfare, including the
81. Id. at 25.
82. Id.

83. Id. at 99.
84. Id. See in particular the Appendices.
85. Id. at 27.

86. Robert Francis, The Impacts of Modern Warfare on Freshwater Ecosystems, 48
ENvTL. MGMT. 985, 989 (2011) ("Rivers often represent targets for the use of explosives,
for example aerial bombing or minelaying, either because settlements are adjacent to
rivers, because they are key transportation corridors, or because their associated
structures (e.g., bridges, jetties, irrigation channels, hydroelectric dams) are of strategic
importance . . . . Use of ordnance can have both direct and indirect impacts. . . .") (citation
omitted).
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exploitation of aquatic systems and soils. The research on the
environmental effects upon soil and water sources is well documented.87
Public works projects were a cornerstone of U.S. stabilization and
reconstruction operations.88 Yet, many of these U.S. projects were
plagued by waste, inefficiency, and corruption. This inefficient
administration, which emerged from the U.S. military, significantly
impeded their ability to complete public water infrastructure projects
during the decade-long reconstruction.8 9
Complicating the stabilization and reconstruction period is the U.S.
military's institutionalized apathy towards environmental protection.90
During combat operations "[v]ery few of the [U.S. military's] strategic
activities actually address ecosystem and habitat concerns."9 1 Moreover,
an insufficient number of U.S. Army policies or doctrines exist that offer
direction on environmental issues encountered during armed conflict:
"Only one Army manual is dedicated to environmental consideration,
and it is not widely used."92 A danger exists that this low priority placed
on the protection of the environment has complicated the stabilization
and reconstruction efforts. Moreover, this apathetic attitude toward the
environment further distances the military from the environmental
87. Giacomo Certini, Riccardo Scalenghe & William I. Woods, The Impact of Warfare
on the Soil Environment, 127 EARTH-SCIENCE REV. 1, 11 (2013). ("[The] physical
disturbance [of soils] is often accompanied by chemical contamination, which makes soils
unsuitable for production purposes and for supporting human welfare in general. Bombs,
in fact, release chemicals that after eventually causing an immediate acute detrimental
effect for living organisms can reside in soil to induce subtler, more enduring effects. The
introduction by weapons with particularly dangerous chemicals, such as dioxins or
radionuclides, may impose indefinite land abandonment and interdiction. Biological
weapons, perhaps the most infamous offensive weapons for soils, are the sad repository for
the dreadful pathogens potentially usable in warfare or terroristic actions, able to keep
these active for a long time or at least conserve their spores.").
88. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION,
FALLUJAH WASTE WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY IN WARTIME CONTRACTING 5
at
available
Report],
Treatment
Water
Fallujah
[hereinafter
(2011)
http://cybercemetery.unt.edularchive/sigir/20131001171803/http://www.sigir.mil/files/audit
s/12-007.pdf.
89. Learning From Iraq: A Final Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq
SIGIR Report], available at
[hereinafter
(Mar. 2013)
Reconstruction 72
http://cybercemetery.unt.edularchive/sigir/20131001083907/http://www.sigir.mil/learningfr
omiraq/index.html.
90. See GREEN WARRIORS, supra note 7, at 4. The Report points to the military's
apathetic attitude toward environmental protection: "As a result, in contingency
operations, environmental issues are not given the same priority as force protection and
safety and they are generally relegated to base-camp managers, many of whom are Army
engineers. Little attention is paid to the strategic implications of the environment on the
desired outcome of a contingency." Id.
91. Id. at 101.
92. Id. at 4, 128.
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effects of its actions upon local communities and a civilian's ability to
maintain wellbeing (for example, by accessing basic services such as
clean drinking water). In the next section, we argue that the military's
new governance mentality contributed to the devastated state of the
environment, the difficulties in the reconstruction effort, and Iraq's
current lack of potable drinking water.

IV. BOMBS, BOMBLETS, BULLETS & ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS: U.S.
RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN IRAQ, 2003-201393
A. Water Quality in Iraq Today
Iraq made significant investments in its infrastructure and public
services during the 1970s due to strong oil revenues. Before the 1991
Gulf War, Iraq's water sector was relatively healthy. At that time:
[a]ccess to potable water was 95 percent in urban areas
with an average supply of about 330 liters per person
per day in Baghdad and about 250 liters per person per
day in other cities. Rural water coverage was 75 percent
with an average supply of about 180 liters per person
per day.94
By the time of the 2003 invasion, however, the governing
institutions and public works were in poor condition as a result of
93. MEDACT REPORT, supra note 15, at 2-3 (internal citations omitted) ("Cluster
weapons contain submunitions called 'bomblets'-explosive projectiles designed to
separate and spread when released. When they explode, fragments of munitions penetrate
the body, maiming or provoking lethal internal bleeding. This 'fragmentation effect' is an
intended design objective. About 30% of victims die even with good life support. Bomblets
are designed to explode on impact, but many fail to explode and become de facto
landmines. . . . Depleted uranium (DU) is used in anti-tank ammunition because it is
dense and heavy, and penetrates heavy armour. . . . Landmines used by Iraq included
anti-personnel (AP) fragmentation mines and blast mines. These cause leg and groin
injuries and secondary infections which often lead to amputations, extensive hospital
stays and rehabilitation. . . . Explosive remnants of war (ERWs) are live munitions left
after conflict. From figures published in Hansard . . . it is possible to calculate that British
cluster weapons alone left between 2,000 and 3,000 ERWs-US ERWs are impossible to
estimate owing to incomplete data. Fleeing Iraqi soldiers abandoned large quantities of
ammunition, often in easily accessible locations, including 100 Iraqi surface-to-air missiles
around Baghdad.").
94. See World Bank, Iraq: Country Water Resource Assistance Strategy: Addressing
Major Threats to People's Livelihoods, in Water, Environment, Social and Rural
Development DepartmentMiddle East and North Africa Region, Rep. No. 36297-IQ, at 35

(June 28, 2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWAT/Resources/Iraq.pdf.
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decades of political dislocation, authoritarian rule, the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988), the bombing campaigns against Iraq during the 1991 Gulf
War, and the sanctions and reparations imposed on Iraq for the
invasion of Kuwait. 95 Today, the magnificent Tigris river basin known to
biblical scholars as the legendary "Garden of Eden"96 is no longer a
vibrant ecosystem or a healthy source of drinking water.9 7
Historically, the Tigris river basin was known for its biologically
diverse ecology, culturally rich social system, and flourishing
wetlands.9 8 After the 1991 uprising against the government of Saddam
Hussein in southern Iraq that followed the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein
drained the Mesopotamian marshlands, killed tens of thousands of
Marsh Arabs, and displaced many of the 300,000 to 500,000 Marsh
Arabs who once called the wetlands home.99 As a result, more than 90%
of the 15,000 square kilometers of ecologically and agriculturally
significant wetlands were destroyed.100 After the fall of Saddam Hussein
in 2003, locals who were reportedly frustrated at the lack of action took
it upon themselves to detonate many of the dams, leading to an
uncontrolled re-flooding of the area.101 This local response has led to the
partial regeneration of the Marshlands, although some scholars have

95. See WILLIAM R. POLK, UNDERSTANDING IRAQ: THE WHOLE SWEEP OF IRAQI
HISTORY, FROM GENGHIS KHAN'S MONGOLS TO THE OTTOMAN TURKS TO THE BRITISH
MANDATE TO THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION 128 (2005) (detailing the deterioration of Iraqi

public infrastructure due to the eight year Iran-Iraq war).
96. Russell E. Bowman, Student Article, Global Cornerstones for Environmental

Recovery in Iraq: A Comparative Law and Policy Analysis of Lessons in Environmental
Response and Remediation, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 501, 508 (2005) [hereinafter Global
Cornerstones]; Curtis J. Richardson & Najah A. Hussain, Restoring the Garden of Eden:

An Ecological Assessment of the Marshes of Iraq, 56 BIOSCIENCE 477, 477 (2006)
[hereinafter Restoring the Garden of Eden].
97. See UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, DESK STUDY ON THE ENVIRONMENT IN
IRAQ 28-30 (2003), available at http://www.unep.org/pdfliraq-ds.pdf [hereinafter UNEP
REPORT].
The Tigris basin (371,562 km2 ) covers parts of the territories of Iran
(47.2% of the basin), Iraq (38%), Turkey (14%) and Syria (0.3%).
Within Iraq, the Tigris River receives water from four main
tributaries, the Khabour, Great Zab, Little Zab and Diyala, which rise
in the mountains of eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran and flow in
a southwesterly direction until they meet the Tigris. A seasonal river,
Al Authaim, rising in the highlands of northern Iraq, also flows into
the Tigris, and is the only significant tributary entirely within Iraq.
Id. at 29. The degradation of the environment of Iraq, therefore, has consequences for
other nations and their populations, as well.

98. See generally Global Cornerstones, supra note 96; Restoring the Garden of Eden,
supra note 96.

99. Restoring the Garden of Eden, supranote 96, at 477.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 480.
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raised concerns that the unplanned rehabilitation of the Mesopotamian
Marshlands could agitate an already fragile ecosystem. 102
Today, many communities continue to rely on the Tigris and
Euphrates river system and the marshlands for drinking water,
irrigation, and waste management. 0 3 Nevertheless, it is not surprising
that after numerous armed conflicts these water resources are showing
signs of pollution and ecological stress, in part because of the use of
chemical weapons and munitions, and other toxic war waste lining the
riverbeds and wetlands. Recently, Marshland rehabilitation plans have
been put forward; but a concern exists that the uncontrolled re-flooding
might adversely affect water quality because "toxins from re-flooded
soils that are contaminated with chemicals, mines, and military
ordnance" 104 could be released. Scientists have expressed concerns
regarding the impact of this toxic waste upon vulnerable local
communities and an already fragile ecosystem if it is released.105
Iraq's precarious state of the natural environment is further
compromised by the military's well-documented use of depleted uranium
Not
anti-tank ammunition, cluster bombs, and landmines.10
defects
in
and
birth
of
cancer
surprisingly, an increase in incidences
by
been
reported
has
U.S.
operations
Fallujah subsequent to the 2004
non-government organizations. 1 07 The United Nations Environmental
Program (UNEP) has identified potential health effects on local civilians
from the use of explosive and toxic weapons combined with "[m]ilitary
waste, including waste from chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
programmes."108 Currently, the Iraqi countryside is strewn with the
artifacts of war-i.e., a variety of toxic munitions and war waste,
including: "unexploded ordnance, spent cartridges/shells/penetrators,
military vehicles[,] . . . depleted uranium[,] .

.

. contaminated soils and

demolition waste (e.g. containing chemicals or asbestos), [and] human
remains and animal remains (leading to elevated disease risks,

102. Id. at 479.
103. See UNEP REPORT, supra note 97, at 28.
104. Restoring the Gardenof Eden, supranote 96, at 481.
105. Id.
106. MEDACT REPORT, supra note 15, at 2. See also MEDACT, ENDURING EFFECTS OF
WAR: HEALTH IN IRAQ 2004 (2004). For a discussion of the health effects of uranium
munitions in Fallujah, and their link to a higher incidence of a birth defects there, see
generally Samira Alaani et al., Uranium and Other Contaminants in Hair From the
Parents of Children with Congenital Anomalies in Fallujah, Iraq, CONFLICT & HEALTH,
2011, at 2-3; Samira Alaani et al., Pilot Study of Congenital Anomaly Rates at Birth in
Fallujah,Iraq, 2010, J. ISLAMIC MED. Ass'N N. AM., Aug. 30, 2012, at 1-2.
107. See generally MEDACT REPORT, supra note 15.
108. UNEP REPORT, supra note 97, at 37.
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especially in urban areas)."109 Remarkably, even though the production
of war artifacts is an expected outcome, the RAND Corporation reported
that little attention is given by the military to the "long term health of
natural systems, including ecosystems and species"110 during armed
conflicts. Consequently, the military's spent wreckage that now litters
Iraq's waterscapes and countryside has created an insidious
environmental legacy for current and future citizens.
In Iraq's military theatre, individual soldiers displayed an
apathetic, disconnected attitude towards environmental protection.
With respect to the discharge of waste in a base camp, a soldier stated:
"We are in the desert, what does it matter?," "The locals don't care, so
why should we?," and "We are just passing through and don't have the
time."111 For a combat soldier, it is reasonable to expect that this
institutionalized attitude of disregard for environmental protection
would naturally be embraced when the bombs begin to drop and bullets
zoom by during chaotic combat. While in-theatre, individual soldiers
separate themselves from the natural environment and any
environmental impact of their actions. In effect, they lack an
environmental ethic during armed "contingency operations." 112
Military instruction also fosters a discharge ethos and has
institutionalized a lack of an environmental ethic of care. Military
training normalizes the soldier's action that "when firing a round
downrange, an artilleryman wasn't 'discarding' the round." 113 The
soldier's task and his weapon are spent: i.e. done, so, he can now "cut
and run."11 4 This permissive discharge ethos encourages toxic
armaments to be abandoned, disposed of, tossed away; distancing the
ordinary solider from the effects of discharging his weapons.115 The
military debris that now litters Iraq's water and land is evidence of this
discharge ethos. The indiscriminate dispersal of toxic military
armaments across the countryside points to an institutional mindset
that releases the environmental violence of its operations onto the

109. Id.
110. GREEN WARRIORS, supranote 7, at 118.
111. Id. at 103.
112. Id. at 131.
113. WILLIAM A. WILCOX, JR., THE MODERN MILITARY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 46 (2007).
114. John Braithwaite, Relational Republican Regulation, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 124,
141 (2013) [hereinafter Relational Republican Regulation] (explaining the idea of "cut and
run," versus an ethical obligation to manage de-escalation).
115. Oddly, even though the discarded munition might be a "safety hazard|]" to the
solider, the spent armament is not considered to be environmentally harmful. WILCOX,
supra note 113, at 46. Although the United States has taken steps to regulate spent
munitions on its own soil as hazardous waste, these regulations do not apply when such
munitions are used in military operations overseas. Id. at 46-48.
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health of civilians and into the natural environment in which local
citizens are expected to live and to flourish socially, culturally, and
economically in a post-conflict scenario.116
Taken together, the discharge ethos and the responsive, adaptive
new governance mentality that transfers the decision-making to the
ordinary solider, sets up the solider to lose his connection with the
natural environment and the impact of his actions on the human
condition. A danger exists that a lack of an ethic of environmental care,
at both a high strategic military level and within the soldier's selfregulatory unit, is fostered, and is displayed by an individual soldier
carrying out his operational roles. 117
Currently, many communities in Iraq have limited access to potable
drinking water and adequate sewage systems as a result of the violence
of war. This governance failure reflects a lack of an environmental ethic,
environmental rights, and administrative oversight, which is discussed
further below.1 18 Natural sources of drinking water are showing signs of
stress, including "salt accumulation problems, toxic elements, and
severe water quality degradation," as well as water scarcity. 119 A U.S.
military campaign targeting industrial facilities and providing limited
protection for public works projects has created a vulnerable situation
for Iraqi citizens, especially local women and children.
Women and children are particularly vulnerable to toxins because of
"critical windows of exposure" to their endocrine systems and limited

116. Rob Nixon, Ecologies of the Aftermath: Precision Warfare and Slow Violence, in
SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR 199 (2011). Nixon argues that
the narrative of a precise, smart war needs to be countered and he explains "[wihat such
narratives downplay is the way each war generates a distinctive, historically specific
chemical, radio-logical, epidemiological, and environmental legacy." Id. at 209. For
example "[t]he turn to depleted-uranium warfare and the unprecedented proliferation of
cluster bombs demands that we revisit the question of who counts as a casualty." Id. at
211 Nixon argues that the "the deferred casualties among refugees returning to poisoned,
radiated landscape[s]" need to be included in the calculus. Id. "For we need to measure a
weapon's 'kill range' not just across the battlefield space but across ecological and genetic
time as well." Id. at 213. Nixon ends his argument with a plea to change the focus to "the
slow-moving stories about the long dying . . . about depleted uranium that treats as its
arbitrary enemy the child of a child as yet unborn." Id. at 232.
117. GREEN WARRIORS, supra note 7.
118. Sharmila L. Murthy, Iraq's ConstitutionalMandate to Justly Distribute Water: The
Implications of Federalism, Islam, InternationalLaw and Human Rights, 42 GEO. WASH.
INT'L. L. REV. 749, 750 (2010); see also UNEP REPORT, supra note 97, at 45; Costs and
Consequences of War in Iraq: Fact Sheet 2, CENTER FOR EcON. & Soc. RTS.,
http://www.cesr.org/downloads/Costs%20and%2Consequences%2%Oo/2OWar%20in%20Ir
aq.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
119. Restoring the Garden of Eden, supra note 96, at 484.
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access to governance regimes. 120 In a healthy natural environment, the
transmission of the toxins can occur by either directly ingesting the
toxic water or through hand to mouth contact with the soil or breathing
in air with toxic dust particles. As expected, in war-ravaged waters and
landscapes, toxicity levels are heightened and are present as a
particularly risky public health problem for families and individuals in
the local community.
Military doctrine pays little attention to fostering an ethic of
environmental care, an ethic that should be directed at an ordinary
soldier in order to facilitate decision-making that considers the
environmental implications of his actions while operating on the ground
in the intense, complicated theatre of war. 121 Sadly, the degraded state
of water resources has created an environmental injustice that places
the risks of drinking from contaminated water sources on vulnerable
civilians while discharging the military of their responsibility for
degrading the water source. In economic terms, this environmental
degradation is disregarded as an externality (i.e., market failure) of
war. 122
B. "New governance": Corruptionand the Coalition Reconstructionof
Iraq,2003-2013

In 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) banned all
members of the Ba'ath Party from holding public service jobs.123 The

120. NATIONAL NETWORK ON ENVIRONMENTS AND WOMEN'S HEALTH, THE GENDERED

HEALTH EFFECTS OF CHRONIC Low-DOSE ExPosURES TO CHEMICALS IN DRINKING WATER
14, 31 (2009),
http://www.nnewh.org/images/upload/attach/1588hamm%202009.pdf
("Critical windows of vulnerability have been broadly identified according to
developmental and reproductive stages. These stages include preconception, the
embryonic and fetal period (pregnancy), the neonatal period, the first three years of life,
preschool and school age, and adolescence. In general, the most vulnerable stages are
those of fetal and early postnatal development. The developing immune systems of infants
and children, their unique behavioural characteristics, and greater exposure patterns
result in very different sensitivities to contaminants than in adults. Importantly, the
exposure patterns of infants and children also change dramatically as they mature.").
121. GREEN WARRIORS, supra note 7, at 133 (recommending the adoption of a
sustainability ethic).
122. See THE QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS

OF POLLUTION 1 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 2005) (explaining the now prevalent use of the
term "environmental injustice").
123. SIGIR Report, supra note 89, at 105. "Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez,
Commander of Coalition forces in Iraq from June 2003 to June 2004, later stated that this
order 'essentially ...eliminated the entire government and civic capacity of the nation"' See
Id. The order banning all members of the Ba'ath Party from the public service was CPA
Order 1 of 16 May 2003 issued by the head of the CPA, L. Paul Bremer.
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military invasion and the de-Ba'athification program led to a complete
collapse of governing institutions and the public sector, which then had
to be rebuilt from the ground up.124 In March of 2013, Stuart Bowen, the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, produced his final
report (SIGIR) for the U.S. Congress detailing the inefficiencies, waste,
and corruption that led to widespread failures in Coalition
reconstruction projects in Iraq. The reconstruction was overseen by a
myriad of U.S. and Coalition government agencies, multi-national
forces, nascent Iraqi government ministries who often had poor training
and resources, hundreds of private contracting companies, and an
unknown number of non-governmental organizations, leading the
SIGIR Report to ask whether the reconstruction was simply too complex
to oversee and police adequately.125
Research demonstrates that good governance bolsters an
individual's sense of well-being, while corruption leads to lower levels of
well-being for individuals and, collectively, for communities. 126 Corrupt
practices prevailed during the reconstruction period. SIGIR reported
deficiencies among all sectors in record keeping making it impossible to
trace programs and accounts. 27 Among the private companies
contracted to undertake construction work, the auditors found
inadequate billing records, fraud, abuse, and over-billing-amounting in
many cases to mark-ups of thousands of percent for small items.128
One failed reconstruction project is the $100 million sewage
treatment facility in Fallujah.129 Following the massive 2004 Coalition
operations, the plant was to be built to reassure the city's population of
the efficacy and legitimacy of the new Iraqi government. The plant-a
flagship project-was an example of a public-private partnership and
decentralized planning. The main contract was awarded to the Fluor
Corporation of Texas, who subcontracted the work out to various private
contractors. Reportedly, the final project cost totaled more than three
times the original estimate, and the plant was only partially completed
after substantial delays for primarily two reasons: an inability to
establish basic security in the city, and a failure by the contractors to
establish an adequate electrical power source.130 Today, in Fallujah,
124. Id.
125. See generally id. at ix-xii (explaining broadly the costs and issues of the Iraq
reconstruction project).
126. WORLD HAPPINESS REPORT 121, 141 (John Helliwell et al. eds., 2013), available at
http://www.earth.columbia.edulsitefiles/file/Sachs%20Writing/2012/World%2OHappiness%
20Report.pdf.
127. SIGIR Report, supranote 89, at 74.
128. Id. at 3.

129. FallujahWater Treatment Report, supra note 88, at 29.
130. SIGIR Report, supranote 89, at 82.
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children play in the streets where raw sewage flows freely. The city has
limited potable drinking water. This degraded environment is
considered a significant source of morbidity and mortality among the
city residents1 31 and contributes to the reported lack of well-being
among Iraqis.1 32
Paradoxically, crude oil production in Iraq is steadily increasing. It
is higher than at the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, and is
approaching its all-time high of 1979.133 Increasing oil production
suggests that state revenues should be increasing, which raises the
question: Who is benefiting from these increased revenues? One
wonders whether the present reconstruction effort will return the water
sector to a healthy state; that is, to a pre-1991 Gulf War public service
where "[a]ccess to potable water was 95 percent in urban areas."134
Reestablishing basic water infrastructure and governance in postconflict Iraq has not been a successful endeavor for the Coalition
reconstruction campaign. One example is the U.S. reconstitution of the
Iraqi Ministry of Irrigation. At the time of the 2003 invasion, the
Ministry of Irrigation employed about 12,000 people-less than a third
of its labor force in 1917-and contracted with 11 state-owned or linked
companies under the direction of the Minister of Irrigation 3 5 After the
invasion, the Ministry was looted, leaving its infrastructure in disarray.
Stripped of furniture, computers, computer systems, and records, the
Ministry had no e-mail, no ability to store databases, no central records
to manage payroll, and no human resource records. 136 The U.S.
administration, with the assistance of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, restructured the Iraqi's Ministry of Water Resources. 137 The
ideology of the new, reconstructed Ministry included many of the
market economy principles of new governance: participatory decisionmaking, reliance on public-private partnerships, deregulation and
privatization, and privileging of experimentation and fallibility, such
that the new Ministry relied upon techniques and metrics that

131. Id.
132. See WORLD HAPPINESS REPORT, supra note 126, at 141 (observing factors that
contribute to insufficient happiness, including services and ecological issues).
133. SIGIR Report, supranote 89, at 83.
134. WORLD BANK, IRAQ: WATER RESOURCES INTERIM ASSISTANCE STRATEGY 35 (2006),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWAT/Resources/Iraq.pdf.
135. Michael J. Bishop et al., Iraq Ministry of Water Resources CapacityBuilding, DEF.
TECHNICAL INFO. CENTER (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Iraq Ministry of Water],
http://www.dtic.millndia/2005triservice/track4/wilhelms.pdf.
136. Id.
137. Thomas O'Hara & Eugene Stakhiv, IraqiMinistry of Water Resources is Similar to
Corps, 27 ENGINEER UPDATE (2003), available at http://archive.today/Zx4tG.
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encourage "risk, failure, [and] success."1 38 Rather quickly, the eleven
state-run companies were transformed into public offerings to foreign
companies. This transition was announced in the news media by
revealing that the Iraqi government will spend $1.5 billion dollars
annually for the next two to three years on fifty water and sewage
projects, "which will be open to work by foreign contractors."139
Conceivably, this infrastructure reconstruction activity is a sign of
recovery. On the other hand, good governance demands the elimination
of corruption. In Iraq, corruption has significantly hampered
reconstruction efforts. Water sources remain seriously polluted, potable
water for ordinary Iraqis remains scarce, and a recent flood caused a
dam failure in the south.140 A recent trip by one of the authors through
Iraq's major cities, including Basra-the economic hub of southern
Iraq's oil sector-reveals that many large and luxurious houses are
being built, making ample use of the region's deposits of marble and
granite. But, just outside these opulent doors, the streets are littered
with rubble and remain unpaved and dangerous. Public water services
are limited. If the water does run through the city's leaky pipes, it is
contaminated-it is neither clean nor potable.141 The canals of Basra-a
city once heralded as the "Venice of the East"149-are now filled with
garbage and raw sewage. The Basra Governorate has seen a population
growth of over one million people since 1997.143 Many displaced citizens
are crowded into the large slums surrounding Basra. Dislocated Arabs
from the Marshlands have erected mud huts under the bridges of the
Euphrates where they graze their water buffalo in polluted canals.
Violence is commonplace, claiming more than 3,000 lives in the first half

138. Iraq Ministry of Water, supra note 135.
139. John Lee, 50 Water/Sewage Projects Planned, IRAQ Bus. NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013),
http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2013/09/23/50-watersewage-projects-planned/.
140. Omar Al-Shaher, Floods Cause Severe Damage in Southern Iraq, AL-MONITOR
(May
14,
2013),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/floods-iraq-raindamages-deaths.html. The dam in Mosul may be one of the most dangerous in the world.
It could break down, flooding both Mosul and Baghdad. See Andrew G. Wright, IraqiDam
Has Experts on Edge Until Inspection Eases Fears, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD (May 5,
2003), http://enr.construction.com/news/Front2003/archives/030505.asp.
141. In Basra, a recent study has found that water runs through the public network
only 12% of the hours in the day, while 4.2% of the population have experienced diarrhoea
in the past two weeks. See JOINT ANALYSIS & POL'Y UNIT IRAQ, http://www.japuiraq.org/gp/.
142. Aref Mohammed, Iraq Oil Hub Basra Hoping to See Its Share of Wealth, REUTERS
(Aug. 10, 2010, 6:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/10/us-iraq-oil-basraidUSTRE6791GX20100810.
143. See Iraq, CITY POPULATION, http://www.citypopulation.de/Iraq.html.
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of 2013, poised to be greater than in any year since the sectarian
violence of 2008.144
Iraqis and their communities are impoverished by the violence of
war-a corrupt government, a loss of their commons, and lives that are
difficult and dangerous. In Iraq, new governance primarily served and
continues to serve the interests of the military, private contractors, and
Iraqi citizens with high positions in the oil sector, whereas basic
security and public services for ordinary Iraqi citizens is overlooked by
governance institutions and has harmed them. Freedom subsists not
only in the absence of dictatorship or in the ability to cast a vote, but
also depends on one's ability to live in safety with dignity, and to have a
vibrant, healthy commons to provide for the basic needs of one's
community.
For those who would argue that foreign contractors and expertise
might be necessary to fix the widespread and serious deficiencies in the
Iraqi water governance regime, it is worth considering that Iraq is now
considered one of the most corrupt governments in the world according
to Transparency International.145 This recognized situation of
corruption surely shapes the government's negotiations with foreign
contractors. The SIGIR Report recommends that governance failures
seen in Iraq's reconstruction can be avoided by "planning
comprehensively and in an integrated fashion," more "responsive team
building," and better "information management systems."146 Given these
significant failures, one must question the precepts of the governance
model. Can the new governance mentality of flexibility, adaptation, and
private-public partnership bring Iraq's public water infrastructure back
even to where it was in the 1970s?
New governance processes may not, in the absence of a moral
foundation, be sufficient to fix the mistakes that plagued the Iraq
reconstruction efforts. John Braithwaite, a preeminent regulatory
scholar, argues that "[a]ll regulatory ideas are dangerous if they are not
embedded in a moral philosophy explicitly designed to restrain their
excess." 147 Governance scholars must consider whether the extensive
decentralization, privatization, and deregulation used to govern the Iraq
reconstruction is simply fed back into government and private

144. Documented
Civilian Deaths from Violence,
IRAQ
BODY
COUNT,
http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/.
145. Corruption
Perceptions
Index
2012,
TRANSPARENCY
IN'L,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Apr. 5, 2014) (ranking Iraq as
169th and Afghanistan as tied for last out of 176 countries).
146. SIGIR Report, supranote 89, at xii.

147. RelationalRepublican Regulation, supra note 114, at 128.
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institutions, revealing a dark side of the military's new governance
mentality and reinforcing its lack of an environmental ethic.
CONCLUSION

In this article, we examined a dark side of the new governance
theory by considering the U.S. military's new governance mentality (i.e.,
an adaptive, devolved decision-making organizational model) that
mirrors the features of the new governance framework and is reflected
in the military's practices, management development literature, and
doctrine. By considering the Iraq theatre of war, a danger we uncover is
the lack of an environmental ethic of care that is exposed when the
features of the new governance model are mapped onto the U.S.
military's recent shift to an adaptive mode of governance. We contend
that the military's new governance mentality and apathetic attitude
toward environmental protection are contributory factors to the
devastated state of the environment in Iraq and the country's lack of
potable drinking water. An environmental ethic should permeate
military doctrine and be directed at the ordinary soldier, whereby his
and her actions can remain ordered by "core values of our [globalized]
society-respect for quality of life, the environment and human
dignity." 48 We further maintain that modern military organizations
engaged in large-scale reconstruction efforts should be moral
institutions, instilled with an ethic of environmental care, and an
administrative structure sufficient to prevent widespread corruption;
otherwise, the perils of governance, as predicted by Braithwaite, are
unleashed.
Looking at the 2003-2013 Coalition campaign in Iraq through the
lens of new governance may lend an interesting perspective on the way
new governance has developed within the military and reconstructiondevelopment sectors. We question the precepts of the new governance
model in a situation where governance institutions are already
weakened, and corruption prevails and perverts the governance regime.
With the wide range of actors involved in the Coalition campaign, the
differing goals and interests involved, and its overwhelming complexity,
it may be difficult to speak of a unified new governance approach. New
governance is rather a collection of principles, mentalities, and methods
whose outcomes depend greatly on the social and political context, the
state of existing governance institutions, and the values and goals that
motivate practitioners. A dark side of new governance is exposed when
it is placed in the service of goals and institutions that have already
148. Ethical Manufacturing,supra note 69, at 464.
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chosen to work through "the dark side." 149 This dark side orientation
should be offset by the development of core values that uphold a social
responsibility, rather than simply methods and processes of new
governance.
The complexity, inefficiency, and corruption that characterized the
Iraq reconstruction efforts casts a long dark shadow over the new
governance model and raises further doubt that this mode of governance
is appropriate in post-conflict situations. The myriad of private
companies and organizations involved in the reconstruction effort
further exposes the precarious nature of this governance model and
demands that we think more deeply about whether new governance is
itself a mode of governance, or whether these processes are simply laid
on top of established governing institutions in order to mitigate
entrenched institutional ill effects. If so, then governments and
governance scholars should be wary of the danger of imposing these
processes onto governing institutions that are already fragile,
undeveloped, and inadequate. Instead, the first step should be to lay
down a simpler governance framework, in which a small number of
private companies and NGOs can play a subordinate and supporting
role, so that goal setting and planning can be engaged and adequate
methods of accountability can be established by a centralized
governance regime-perhaps, at a global, networked scale.

149. U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney stated to Tim Russert in an interview that the
administration had chosen to work through "the dark side." Tim Russert, Meet the Press
(NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001).

